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Introduction 
With the growth of the movement of individuals between nations, it is natural that the 
number of tort claims involving elements from more than one jurisdiction has increased 
and will continue to do so.  This has created a need for clear rules on questions of loss 
distribution or compensation, given that this is the focus of most claims in tort.  These 
questions include: 
 
9 The nature of the remedy available to the plaintiff 
9 The heads of damages that may be available 
9 How to quantify the claim under each relevant head of damage 
9 Any defences that might affect quantification, such as contributory negligence 
 
Other relevant issues, including the appropriate limitations period to apply and survival 
of actions, will not be considered in detail in this paper.  Non-monetary remedies have 
recently been considered elsewhere.2
 
Traditionally, the question as to which law should be applied to resolve these loss 
distribution issues has been resolved by resort to the distinction between substance and 
procedure.  It is trite law that matters of substance are to be governed by the law of the 
cause, with matters of procedure to be governed by the law of the forum.  This apparently 
simple and sensible distinction has, however, caused and continues to cause difficulties 
for courts in a range of jurisdictions.  For example, the High Court of Australia has 
recently expressly reserved the question whether in international torts cases the question 
of kinds and quantification of damages should be governed by the law of the place of the 
wrong,3 justifying a fuller examination of the issue.  Further, despite the Private 
International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (UK),4 uncertainty remains in the 
                                                 
1 Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Southern Queensland, Australia.  Thanks to two anonymous 
referees for their input into this paper, and the article has benefitted from the input of Professor Reid 
Mortensen of the School of Law, University of Southern Queensland. 
2 George Panagopoulos ‘Substance and Procedure in Private International Law’ (2005) 1 Journal of Private 
International Law 69, 82-91 
3 Regie Nationale Renault v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491 (Zhang).  Speaking of its earlier decision in John 
Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503 (Pfeiffer), the unanimous court said in Zhang ‘the 
conclusion was reached that the application of limitation periods should continue to be governed by the lex 
loci delicti and, secondly, that ‘all questions about the kinds of damage, or amount of damages that may be 
recovered, would likewise be treated as substantive issues governed by the lex loci delicti (original 
emphasis).  We would reserve for further consideration, as the occasion arises, whether that latter 
proposition should be applied in cases of foreign tort’ (520). 
4 It is not clear at this time whether this statute will be amended or repealed once Rome II becomes 
effective in 2009. 
correct approach, evidenced by conflicting recent English decisions.5  Canadian courts 
are to some extent in retreat from earlier positions.6   
 
The uncertainty and inconsistency involved in the approach to the issue by the common 
law courts justifies a fuller examination of this issue.  The focus of this article then will 
be how best to determine the issue of loss distribution or compensation in a tort case 
involving more than one country, in the context that this cannot be regarded as a settled 
issue given the variety of judicial and legislative responses in this area in recent years.  In 
so doing, the article will consider the methodology adopted by the courts in the recent 
cases.  The article will conclude that a narrow definition of procedure should be taken, so 
as not to undermine the general trend in favour of territoriality, to best meet the 
objectives of choice of law rules, and to not encourage forum shopping in seeking 
compensation for a tort.  We must in doing so remember the purpose of the 
substance/procedure distinction.  We should not adopt the past right/remedy distinction. 
 
Background 
It is said that for at least seven centuries, courts have applied a rule that substantive rights 
are to be governed by the law of the cause, while procedural issues are to be governed by 
the law of the forum.7  While this is unremarkable, the difficult issue has been where to 
drawn the line between matters that are substantive and those that are procedural.  It has 
been argued there is no clear line of demarcation between the two: 
 
we (should) admit that the substantive shades off by imperceptible degrees into the procedural, and that the 
‘line’ between them does not ‘exist’, to be discovered by logic and analysis, but is rather to be drawn so as 
best to carry out our purpose8
 
                                                 
5 The House of Lords overruled the Court of Appeal in the Harding v Wealands litigation, to be discussed 
presently. 
6 Compare for example the Supreme Court of Canada’s views on this issue in Tolofson v Jensen [1994] 3 
SCR 1022 with that of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Somers v Fournier (2002) 214 DLR (4th) 611 
7 Edgar Ailes ‘Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws’ (1941) 39 Michigan Law Review 392: ‘It 
is perhaps the most inveterate doctrine of the conflict of laws that all questions of procedure in a given 
instance are governed by the lex fori … regardless of the law under which the substantive rights of the 
parties accrued.  Ailes refers to a 1265 French case where before the Parliament of Paris, the defendant 
offered an excuse for non-appearance in English terminology, arguing that the law of England allowed the 
claim.  The defendant’s contention was overruled on the ground that the matter was ‘de processu causae’ 
and govered by the law of the forum.  He states the exact date at which this doctrine was applied in English 
law is unknown, but cites then a 1705 case where the Court of Chancery applied the English statute of 
limitations in a suit upon a foreign obligation (Dupleix v De Roven  2 Vern. 540, 23 ER 950 (1705). 
8 Walter Wheeler Cook ‘Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws’ (1933) 42 Yale Law Journal 333, 
343-344.  It is submitted there is a legitimate purpose to the distinction – why should the local court 
inconvenience itself by adopting the form of foreign proceedings?  However, there is also an illegitimate 
purpose to it, with some commentators commenting on the distinction as an ‘escape device’ open to a court 
which does not wish to apply an aspect of the law of the place of the wrong.  By classifying the issue as 
procedural instead, it bypasses the problem:  Jean-Gabriel Castel ‘Back to the Future!  Is the New Rigid 
Choice of Law Rule for Interprovincial Torts Constitutionally Mandated? (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 35, 70.  Lord Wilbeforce in Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356, 393 suggested there was ‘artifice’ in 
regarding a right to recover damages for pain and suffering as procedural.  One wonders what other reason 
there can be for this artifice, other than to provide what the forum court considers to be an appropriate 
remedy in the circumstances.   
Unfortunately, many courts have proceeded as if there were a clear line of demarcation 
between the two, and relied on the words and language used in relevant statutes, rather 
than bear in mind the purpose of the distinction.  For example, in the context of limitation 
periods, a strict distinction was drawn between limitation statutes which actually 
extinguish the right to bring the action, and statutes which merely forbid recovery after a 
certain period.  The former had been classified as substantive, the latter merely 
procedural,9 though this did not escape criticism,10 and the distinction was finally 
abolished in several countries by a combination of legislation11 and case law,12 though it 
continues to exist in the United States.13  While this issue might have been resolved one 
way or another, other issues relevant to the characterization of procedure remain.   
 
However, the experience with limitation periods is considered instructive.  Limitation 
periods that once were considered to be procedural are now seen to be substantive.  As 
                                                 
9 McKain v R W Miller and Co (SA) Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 1 (per Brennan Dawson Toohey and McHugh 
JJ at 41), Pedersen v Young (1964) 110 CLR 162, Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, Yew 
Bon Tew v Kenderaan Bas Mara [1983] 1 AC 553, Edgar Ailes ‘Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of 
Laws’ (1941) 39 Michigan Law Review 474, 495.  The view was explained as being based on a belief that 
unless statutes of limitation were procedural, foreign litigants might have advantages that were not 
available to forum litigants.  There was a further view that a common law cause of action gave the plaintiff 
a right that endured forever.  A statute of limitation would usually only remove the remedy.  (The rights of 
the defendant were not considered in this analysis): Tolofson v Jensen (1994) 3 SCR 1022, 1069 
10 W E Beckett ‘The Question of Classification in Private International Law’ British Yearbook of 
International Law 46, 71, Australian Law Reform Commission Choice of Law Report No 58 (1992) 10.33 
(recommending abolition of the distinction), Dixon CJ in Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR at 267 referred 
to the ‘inveterate tendency of English law to regard some matters as evidentiary or procedural which in 
reality must operate to impair or destroy rights in substance’,  McKain v Miller n9 per Mason CJ at 23-24, 
Deane J at 48 (‘the unavailability of a remedy by reason of a limitation period will ordinarily be of 
immeasurably greater significance than the theoretical persistence of the underlying right’), Gaudron J at 
61-62.; Adrian Briggs ‘Conflict of Laws and Commercial Remedies’ in Andrew Burrows and Edwin Peel 
(eds) Commercial Remedies (2003) p274-278; Adrian Briggs The Conflict of Laws (2002) p38 dismisses 
the distinction as simply ‘an arid exercise in theory’ with no justification; per Goudling J in Chase 
Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) [1981] Ch 105, 124 ‘right and remedy are indissolubly 
connected and correlated … it is as idle to ask whether the court vindicates the suitor’s substantive right or 
gives the suitor a procedural remedy as to ask whether thought is a mental or a cerebral process’.  
11 S16 Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 (UK) and in each Australian state; see for example, the Choice 
of Law (Limitation Periods) Act 1996 (Qld) 
12 In Australia - Pfeiffer at 544 (Gleeson CJ Gaudron McHugh Gummow Hayne JJ), Kirby J (554-555) and 
Callinan (574), in Canada - Tolofson v Jensen (1994) 3 SCR 1022, 1071, and in South Africa – Society of 
Lloyds v Price; Society of Lloyd’s v Lee [2006] SCA 87.   
13 The Restatement (Second), revised in 1988, which provide regarding statutes of limitation the general 
rule that, unless exceptional circumstances of the case make such a result unreasonable, the forum should 
apply its own statute of limitations barring the claim, and its own statute of limitations permitting the claim, 
unless (a) maintenance of the claim would serve no substantial interest of the forum, and (b) the claim 
would be barred under the statute of limitations of a state having a more significant relationship to the 
parties and the occurrence.   Some American states still maintain a distinction between statutes that create 
the right and those that do not – a recent example is Gomez v ITT Educational Services Inc 71 SW 3d 542 
(Arkansas 2002).  In 1998, the Court of Appeals (Sixth Circuit) applied the limitation period of the forum 
to a matter involving a Californian defendant.  The Ohio agreement between the parties stated that 
Californian law would apply to the parties’ relations.  The plaintiff was the wife of the deceased, who had 
contracted with the defendant.  Californian law time-barred her claim; Ohio law allowed it.  The court 
applied the Ohio limitation period, so the plaintiff could bring her claim, although the action would have 
been statute-barred in California:  Cole v Mileti (1998) 133 F 2d 433 (Sixth Circuit). 
we will see, this is not a new thing in law – there is a long history of what in the past was 
procedural now being seen as substantive.14  There is less scope for a court to justify 
resorting to its own laws to resolve the issue.  It is submitted that this trend should be 
applied in the context of financial remedies, where the position remains equivocal. 
 
One of these contentious issues is the related (as we will see below) distinction between a 
law which denied a remedy in respect of a particular head of damage in negligence (a 
substantive law), and a law which affected the quantification of damages in respect of a 
particular head of damage, which traditionally was considered to be procedural.15  This 
view was applied by the majority of the High Court of Australia in 1993 in Stevens v 
Head,16 where it was concluded that the quantification of damages in a tort action was a 
matter for the law of the forum.  It was applied recently by the House of Lords in 
Harding v Wealands.17  These decisions have allowed the plaintiff to bypass provisions 
in the law of the place of the wrong which limited the amount for which she could 
recover, by bringing action in another jurisdiction where no such limits applied.18  Even 
the question whether a tort action survived the death of the tortfeasor has been classified 
as procedural.19
 
Reason for the Distinction  
Professor Cook argued that the distinction between substance and procedure should be 
understood in terms of the purpose of the distinction,20 interpreted by Mason CJ in 
McKain as being associated with the efficiency of litigation:   
                                                 
14 Edgar Ailes in ‘Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws’ (1941) 39 Michigan Law Review 392, 
402 ‘many rules of modern substantive law had their origin in procedural devices’. 
15 Boys v Chaplin  [1971] AC 356, per Lord Hodson 378-379, Lord Guest 381-382, and Lord Wilberforce 
393; Lord Donovan thought the forum court should ‘award its own remedies’ (383)(similar to Tindal CJ in 
Huber v Steiner (1835) 132 ER 80, who thought that ‘so much of the law that affects the rights and merit of 
the contract … is adopted from the foreign country, so much of the law as affects the remedy only … is 
taken from the law of the forum of that country where the action is brought’); cf Lord Pearson 394-395 who 
thought quantification of damages was a matter of substance.  The majority view here is inconsistent with 
the position in another context  - quantification of damages in a breach of contract context has been held to 
be substantive:  Ekins v East India Co (1717) 24 ER 441.  A fuller discussion of the judgments in Boys 
appears in J J Fawcett ‘Policy Considerations in Tort Choice of Law’ (1984) 47 Modern Law Review 650 
16 (1993) 176 CLR 433 per Brennan Dawson Toohey and McHugh JJ, Mason CJ Deane and Gaudron JJ 
dissenting 
17 [2006] 3 WLR 83 
18 The case provides a perfect example of forum shopping at work.  Perhaps surprisingly, the Australian 
Law Reform Commission in its Choice of Law Report No 58  (1992) recommended that quantification of 
damages should be regarded as substantive in interstate tort matters, but continue to be regarded as 
procedural in international tort matters (para 10.45) 
19 Grant v McAuliffe (1953) 264 P 2d 944 (California)(court applied the forum law to resolve the issue 
whether the action was survived on the basis that it was a procedural issue; the obvious point that the matter 
should be governed by forum law because both parties lived there was not used).  However, in contrast 
deciding whether a plaintiff had title to sue was classified by substantive by the Scottish Court of Sessions 
in FMC Corporation v Russell (1999) SLT 99:  Elizabeth Crawford ‘The Adjective and the Noun: Title and 
Right to Sue in International Private Law’ [2000] Juridical Review 347 
20 ‘Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws’ (1933) 42 Yale Law Journal 333, 343-344.  He then 
suggested the relevant question was how far the forum court could go in applying the rules taken from the 
foreign system of law without unduly hindering or inconveniencing itself, but this test was dismissed by 
Mason CJ in McKain (26) as being too vague. 
That efficiency is achieved by the adoption and application of the rules of practice and procedure and by 
the judges’ practical familiarity with those rules … the essence of what is procedural may be found in those 
rules which are directed to governing or regulating the mode or conduct of court proceedings21
 
Five members of the High Court of Australia expressly adopted these comments in 
Pfeiffer.22  Similarly, Dicey and Morris state that the 
Primary object of this rule (ie that procedure should be governed by the law of the forum) is to obviate the 
inconvenience of conducting the trial of a case concerning foreign elements in a manner with which the 
court is unfamiliar … If therefore it is possible to apply a foreign rule, without causing any such 
inconvenience, those rules should not necessarily … be classified as procedural.23
 
To like effect are comments by Sir William Beckett: 
Its basis is an obvious practical necessity.  In each country courts are organized in the manner found 
appropriate by the lex fori, which determines which courts have jurisdiction in different classes of case, the 
method in which proceedings must be instituted and the pleadings, written and oral, conducted, and the 
manner and the stage at which evidence must be given and judgment delivered, and the means by which the 
judgments can be executed.  In all these matters if it obvious that an English court cannot be expected at 
one time to apply French and at another Japanese procedure, and it is impossible for any law other than the 
lex fori to apply.  There is absolute unanimity in the systems of all countries that all these matters are 
governed by the lex fori24
 
The reversion to forum law is difficult to justify for any reason except for the need for 
courts to be run by their own rules.  These sentiments have been applied by the High 
Court of Australia, by the English Court of Appeal, by the Supreme Court of Canada,25 
and by some courts in the United States.26  However, some recent decisions are in the 
author’s view contrary to the above sentiments in the breadth they give to the concept of 
procedure, and it is submitted with respect these were incorrectly decided.  Courts in one 
jurisdiction are equivocating on the application of the principles above in some kinds of 
case, and it will be submitted they should apply these principles completely. 
 
The Link Between Characterisation of Procedure and Choice of Law 
                                                 
21 n9,26-27; to like effect Gaudron J in Stevens, p469 
22 Gleeson CJ Gaudron McHugh Gummow Hayne JJ p543-544; Kirby J adopted a similar test (563), as did 
Callinan J (574) 
23 The Conflict of Laws (2006) 14th edition p178.  The authors conclude that the previously wide meaning 
of procedure has been abandoned because it tends to frustrate the purposes of choice of law rules (p177).  
Refer also to Lush LJ in Poyser v Minors (1881) 7 QBD 329,333 ‘practice, like procedure, denotes the 
mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, as distinguished from the law which gives or defines 
the right, and which by means of the proceeding the court is to administer the machinery as distinguished 
from its product’.  Panagopoulos neatly summarises the distinction as involving questions of manner 
(procedure) and matter (substance):  ‘Substance and Procedure in Private Intenrational Law’ (2005) 1 
Journal of Private International Law 69, 71 
24 Sir William Beckett ‘The Question of Classification (‘Qualification’) in Private International Law (1934) 
15 British Year Book of International Law 46, 66 
25 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503; Wealands v Harding [2005] 1 WLR 1539; 
Tolofson v Jensen 1994] 3 SCR 1022, per La Forest J ‘procedural characterisation identifies those rules that 
are necessary to make the machinery of the forum run smoothly, as distinguished from those rules that are 
determinative of the parties’ rights’ (1072) 
26 Eg Heavner v Uniroyal Inc (305 A 2d 412, 415 (1973)  ‘it would be an impossible task for the court to 
conform to procedural methods and diversities of the state whose substantive law is to be applied’. 
It must be acknowledged that issues within private international law should not be seen in 
isolation, and specifically that the approach that should be taken to questions of substance 
and procedure is closely related to the question of how the substantive law to be applied 
is determined. 
 
For example, when the choice of law rule involved the application of the law of the 
forum, at least in some form, these matters were not as crucial, because the forum court 
would still be applying forum law at some stage.  However, as a range of jurisdictions 
have moved to abolish (judicially or legislatively) or largely abolish the role of the law of 
the forum as the substantive law, the distinction between matters of substance and matters 
of procedure gains more prominence.  It becomes the limit defacto of the application of 
the law of the forum, absent some flexible exception27 or other escape device such as 
renvoi28 or public policy that will allow the court to return to forum law.29  And if a 
flexible exception is not available in particular jurisdictions, a court may feel it necessary 
to give a broader application to what is procedural in order to apply forum law,30 just as it 
might feel the need to resort to renvoi if it wishes to apply forum law.31   
 
This is not defensible, and other authors and this author have elsewhere advocated the 
need for a flexible exception to a general rule favouring the law of the place of the 
wrong.32 However, it would be naïve not to acknowledge this possibility, and others have 
referred to the jurisprudential gymnastics that a denial of a flexible exception have forced 
courts in the past to take, in order that they could apply the law of the forum where they 
believed they should.   
 
                                                 
27 A flexible exception allows a departure from the general rule in ‘appropriate cases’.  It was suggested by 
Lord Wilberforce in Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356 in the context that while the law of the place of the 
wrong should be adopted as the primary choice of law rule, an exception would apply if the place of the 
wrong were fortuitous, or the place of the wrong did not have strong links to the parties or the events.  
There are clear links with this approach and a ‘proper law’ approach.   
28 See Anthony Gray ‘The Rise of the Renvoi in Australia: Creating the Theoretical Framework’ (2007) 
30(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 103; Reid Mortensen ‘Troublesome and Obscure: The 
Renewal of Renvoi in Australia’ (2006) 2 Journal of Private International Law 1; Ernst Schreiber Jr ‘The 
Doctrine of Renvoi in Anglo-American Law’ (1917-18) 31 Harvard Law Review 523 
29 Reid Mortensen ‘Homing Devices in Choice of Tort Law: Australian, British and Canadian Approaches’ 
(2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 839 
30 As Adrian Briggs puts it, ‘all possibility of a flexible exception having been denied, the manipulation of 
the category of procedure was all that was left in the locker’: ‘The Legal Significance of the Place of a 
Tort’ (2002) 2 OxUCLJ 133, 136 
31 As Reid Mortensen puts it, in discussing the recent High Court of Australia decision in Neilson v 
Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd, ‘Troublesome and Obscure: The Renewal of Renvoi in 
Australia’ (2006) 2 Journal of Private International Law 1, 21: ‘it is difficult to leave a close reading of 
Neilson without getting the impression that the High Court made all efforts to have the lex fori – Western 
Australian law – apply to the case’.   
32 Elizabeth James ‘John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson: The Certainty of Federal Choice of Law Rules for 
Intranational Torts: Limitations, Implications and a Few Complications’ (2001) 23 Sydney Law Review 145; 
Geoffrey Lindell ‘Regie National des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 3 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 362;  Anthony Gray ‘Flexibility in Multistate Tort Cases: The Way Forward in 
Australia’ (2004) 23(2) University of Queensland Law Journal 435; Anthony Gray ‘Remedy Issues in 
Multinational Tort Claims: Fashioning a Choice of Law Rule’ (2007) 26(1) University of Queensland Law 
Journal 1 
It may also be, as Reid Mortensen maintains, that once double actionability becomes 
unnecessary, the idea that the assessment of damages is procedural also loses whatever 
foundation it otherwise had, or in other words if the court does not consider the law of the 
forum in considering whether the claim is actionable, it should not do so when assessing 
the quantum of the claim.33
 
Current Position in Selected Jurisdictions 
(a) Australia 
One should acknowledge that different views have been evident on the High Court 
concerning the question of the proper law to apply to the quantification of damages.  
There is a reasonable amount of support for the proposition that questions affecting the 
quantification of damages are a matter of substance to be governed by the law of the 
cause.34  It appealed to a majority of the High Court in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty 
Ltd35 who, after concluding that the place of the wrong was Missouri, said  
 
Even though Australian revenue law features significantly in the respondents’ damages claim, it is merely a 
circumstance bearing on the question whether damage was suffered and, if so, its quantum.  It does not, in 
any relevant sense, determine the liability of the appellant for that damage or the quantum of recoverable 
damage. 
 
The writer takes this to be a statement by a majority of the High Court of Australia that 
the law of the forum does not determine quantum issues in international torts cases, this 
being a matter for the law of the place of the wrong.36     
                                                 
33 ‘Homing Devices in Choice of Tort Law: Australian, British and Canadian Approaches’ (2006) 55 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 839, 876: ‘Once the basic choice of law rule for matters of 
substance is freed of necessary reference to the lex fori, the idea that the assessment of damages is 
procedural and something for the lex fori to deal with also necessarily loses any foundation’.  In other 
words, if the law of the forum does not recognize the head of damage the law of the place of the wrong, it 
cannot be expected that quantification will be for the law of the forum.  However, one must acknowledge 
that the House of Lords in Harding interpreted the legislative developments in the United Kingdom that 
abolished double actionability not to be intended to also abolish the past practice of assessing quantum of 
remedies by forum law. 
34 For example, in Breavington v Godleman (1988) 169 CLR 41 – Mason CJ ‘the measure of damages is 
plainly a question of substantive law’ (79), Wilson and Gaudron JJ ‘there is no reason in logic why the 
forum should not determine questions as to liability (including the extent thereof) by reference to the law of 
the place where the tort was committed’ (91), Deane and Toohey JJ viewed provisions regarding the heads 
of damage available as substantive but did not comment specifically on quantification generally (139 and 
170 respectively); refer also to McKain v Miller per Mason CJ (24), Deane J (48); and  Stevens v Head per 
Mason CJ (448), Deane J (462) and Gaudron J (469); and BHP Billiton v Schultz (2004) 211 CLR 400 
(Kirby J (460)and Callinan J (485))   
35 (1990) 171 CLR 539 (Mason CJ Deane Dawson and Gaudon JJ at 569-570) 
36 There is also some international support for this position.  See for example Cope v Doherty (1958) 44 ER 
1127, 1132, deciding that a restriction on the amount of damages to be recovered was ‘a question of 
liability and not of procedure’, and Lord Wilberforce in Boys (389) stated that parts of the law of the place 
of the wrong that denied, limited or qualified recovery of damages should be given effect.  Even Willes J in 
Phillips stated that a right of action was the ‘creature of the law of the place (of the wrong), and civil 
liability arising out of a wrong derived its birth from the law of the place and its character is determined by 
that law’.  While Phillips is sometimes seen to support the orthodox view, it could also be argued to support 
the view that the law of the place of the wrong (as the substantive law) should govern quantum issues – 
quantum could be seen as part of the ‘creature’ of the right of action, and part of its character.  Further, civil 
liability does not exist in a vacuum – it must relate to quantum, otherwise it is worthless.  As Deane J said 
 
Importantly, given the High Court’s equivocation in Zhang as to whether a different 
approach should be taken in deciding these issues in a domestic or international torts 
conflict context, this majority appeared in a rare Australian case involving an 
international tort, thus answering any arguments that the High Court of Australia dicta 
statements supporting the law of the place of the wrong to govern quantification of 
damages applies only to intra-Australian torts.37  However, this majority was destined to 
be shortlived, given the decisions shortly after in Stevens v Head38 and McKain v 
Miller.39  In the Stevens case, a majority of the court found that quantification of damages 
was a matter of procedure for the forum.40  Given the importance that the dissenting 
position of Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ played in the subsequent development of 
the law in other jurisdictions, it is worth discussing their dissenting views in the two cases 
in more detail. 
 
Mason CJ focused on the sensibility involved in courts of the forum applying their own 
rules of procedure because of the judges’ practical familiarity with those rules, and that 
those rules ensured cases would be heard efficiently and expeditiously.  As a result, 
procedural issues should be confined to those directed to governing or regulating the 
mode or conduct of court proceedings.41  He referred to broader conceptions of 
‘procedure’ as being developed at a time when the importance of international judicial 
comity may not have been given the same recognition as it nowadays commanded.42  A 
broad view of procedure would, he said, frustrate the purpose of choice of law rules (to 
                                                                                                                                                 
in McKain, the existence and extent of a remedy is commonly accepted as an incident and measure of a 
right (48).  It might seem artificial to divide the two, especially in the area of damages for personal injury 
(as all of the cases in this area are) where damage is the gist of the action.  There is no right to sue without 
damage having been proven.  See also Oliver Wendell Holmes ‘Natural Law’ in Collected Legal Papers 
310,313 (1920), noted at 32 Harvard Law Review 40,42 (1918): A substantive right is ‘only the hypostasis 
of a prophecy – the imagination of a substance supporting the fact that the public force will be brought to 
bear upon those who do things said to contravene it’; and Lord Holt in Ashby v White (1703) 92 ER 126 ‘it 
is a vain thing ti imagine a right without a remedy … if a plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have the 
means to vindicate it’. 
37 This is important given that Breavington, McKain and Stevens were all intra-Australian torts cases.  
However, some suggest there should be no difference in the approach to interstate and international 
conflicts:  Jean-Gabriel Castel ‘Back to the Future: Is the New Rigid Choice of Law Rule for 
Interprovincial Torts Constitutionally Mandated?’ (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 35, 37-38 ‘in 
today’s world, there is no valid justification for or advantage in treating interprovincial and international 
conflicts differently’. 
38 (1992) 176 CLR 433 per Brennan Dawson Toohey and McHugh (459), apparently reflecting a change of 
heart by Dawson J since Voth 
39 McKain v R W Millar and Co (SA) Ltd  (1991) 174 CLR 1, when a majority stated that some limitation 
periods could be procedural in nature although they prevented compensation being awarded (Brennan 
Dawson Toohey and McHugh JJ (44), on the basis that the traditional distinction between those 
extinguishing the claim and those barring the remedy ‘is firmly and clearly established as a principle of 
law.. the distinction has operated in practice free of injustice .. there is no warrant for discarding it’.  Refer 
generally to Brian Opeskin ‘Before the High Court: Conflict of Laws and the Quantification of Damages in 
Tort’ (1992) 14 Sydney Law Review 340. 
40 Brennan Dawson Toohey McHugh JJ; Mason CJ Deane Gaudron JJ dissenting 
41 McKain (22)(26-7), Deane and Gaudron JJ to like effect (49,56); in Stevens v Head (1992) 176 CLR 433 
Mason CJ expresses a similar view (445,451), as does Gaudron J (466,469) 
42 McKain (23) 
fulfil foreign rights),43 and encourage forum shoppers.44  Deane J found the distinction 
between right and remedy to confound reality and good sense, in that the existence and 
extent of a remedy was accepted as an incident and measure of a right.45   
 
Regarding the specific question of the classification of remedies in Stevens, Mason CJ 
believed that quantification of damages should be a question of substance for the forum, 
and that suggestions in earlier cases and academic commentary to the effect that 
quantification was procedural were (or should be seen as) based on a very restrictive view 
of quantification – such as the method to be used in assessing compensation, whether 
once and for all or reviewable etc, and that any reading of the authorities suggesting that 
questions bearing on the quantum of damages was misconceived.46
 
The High Court of Australia in the Pfeiffer case re-drew the boundary between substance 
and procedure.  Gleeson CJ Gaudron McHugh Gummow and Hayne JJ noted that the 
plaintiff ‘cannot ask that the courts of the forum adopt procedures … of a kind which 
their constituting statutes do not contemplate’47, and Kirby J suggested the court adopt a 
principle reflecting a distinction based on which rules will make the machinery of the 
forum court run smoothly.48  He made similar comments more recently in the 
intranational tort case of BHP Billiton Limited v Schultz,49 referring to matters of 
procedure as those that ‘simply facilitate the bringing of claims’.50    
 
The current position in Australia on issues regarding the heads of damage and 
quantification of damage in international cases remains equivocal.  The High Court has 
made clear that these matters are to be governed by the law of the place of the wrong in 
torts occurring wholly within Australia,51 and subsequent Australian cases have 
                                                 
43 McKain (24); Deane J to like effect (50); in Stevens v Head (1992) 176 CLR 433 Mason CJ expresses a 
similar view (451) 
44 McKain (25); Deane J to like effect (50); in Stevens v Head (1992) 176 CLR 433 Mason CJ expresses 
similar concern (442,452), as do Deane J (462) and Gaudron J (466) 
45 McKain (48) 
46 447-449 
47 543 
48 554, citing with approval the Canadian decision adopting such an approach Tolofson v Jensen [1994] 3 
SCR 1022.  To like effect, Callinan J concluded ‘what should be regarded as procedural are the laws and 
regulations which are reasonable and necessary in the lex fori for the conduct of the action only; that is to 
say, the laws and rules relating to procedures such as the initiation, preparation and the prosecution of the 
case, the recovery processes following any judgment and the rules of evidence. 
49 (2004) 221 CLR 400 
50 P460 
51 Pfeiffer ‘all questions about the kinds of damages or amount of damages that may be recoverable 
would … be treated as substantive issues governed by the (law of the place of the wrong)(Gleeson CJ 
Gaudron McHugh Gummow and Hayne JJ (544), ‘the statutory cap upon damages … is .. a matter of real 
substance’ (Callinan J (575)).  This position was confirmed in BHP Billiton v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400, 
per Kirby J (460), noting that the damages provisions ‘amount to an alteration of the substantive law.  It 
applies a different rule in relation to the entitlement to, and calculation of, such a claimant’s damages’; to 
like effect Gummow J (444) and Callinan J (485); refer also to .  Similarly, the Second Restatement states 
in s171 that the law of the cause determines the measure of damages.  Methods of assessment, such as 
whether the assessment is by judge or jury, and what evidence is admissible on such a hearing, are matters 
of procedure:  American Law Institute Restatement Second, Conflict of Laws (1971) 
confirmed this position.52  However, similarly to the Supreme Court of Canada,53 the 
High Court of Australia has expressly reserved in the Zhang case the question whether 
this principle should apply in international torts situations.54  Unfortunately, no reason 
was provided by the High Court in Zhang for reserving this question for a future 
occasion.55  Not surprisingly, the High Court’s reservation has been criticised.56   We 
have not seen any further cases where the issue of a financial remedy for an international 
tort has been in issue in this context.57
 
It would have been easy for the court to endorse the previous position in Stevens that 
quantum was a matter for the forum, while heads were a matter for the law of the cause.  
It would have been easy for the court to say that its preferred view in Pfeiffer, that the law 
of the place of the wrong applied to determining both heads of damage and quantum, 
applied to international torts conflicts.  The fact it did not either creates real uncertainty 
as to the High Court of Australia’s thinking on such matters, although it is true that it has 
not been used since by any court, and remains for the moment only a theoretical escape 
device.  Recent English cases, which broadly take the same view as the High Court did in 
Stevens v Head, will now be considered, but one re-iterates that the continuing 
applicability of the Stevens approach in Australia must be questioned after the Zhang 
decision where the question was deliberately left open.   
 
(b) England 
                                                 
52 It was applied recently by the Court of Appeal of New South Wales in McNeilly v Imbree [2007] 
NSWCA 156, where the Court applied Northern Territory caps on damages payouts for an accident that 
occurred in the Territory, see also Hamilton v Merck and Co Inc [2006] NSWCA 55, FAI Allianz Insurance 
Ltd v Lang [2004] NSWCA 413, and Ivancic v Zardo [2004] ACTCA 11; cf the outcome under the old 
principles evidenced in Guidera v Government Insurance Office (NSW)(1990) 11 MVR 423 where the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal applied a New South Wales statute to quantify damage claims arising from 
an accident occurring in the Northern Territory 
53 Tolofson v Jensen [1994] 3 SCR 1022 per La Forest J: ‘because a rigid rule on the international level 
could give rise to injustice, in certain circumstances I am not averse to retaining a discretion in the court to 
apply our own law to deal with such circumstances.  I can however, imagine few cases where this would be 
necessary’. 
54 Zhang (520): ‘we would reserve for further consideration whether (the proposition that all questions 
about the kinds of damage, or amount of damages that may be recovered, are governed by the law of the 
place of the wrong) should be applied in cases of foreign court (unanimous joint judgment).  Mortensen 
suggests that the making of a distinction for damages in international cases would be unprincipled and 
conceptually incoherent in a territory-based regime:  ‘Homing Devices in Choice of Tort Law: Australian, 
British and Canadian Approaches’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 839, 859 
55 It was not necessary for the Court to answer the question here because the case was an appeal from a 
decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal on an issue of forum non conveniens.  It had not yet been 
decided whether or not there was negligence on the defendant’s part, so it was not necessary for the Court 
to consider the question of remedies. 
56 For example, Adrian Briggs ‘The Legal Significance of the Place of a Tort’ (2002) 2 OxUCLJ 133, 136.  
Sir William Aldous in the Court of Appeal in Harding v Wealands [2005] 1 WLR 1539 said it would be 
illogical to apply a different rule for international torts than for intranational torts. 
57 Reid Mortensen in Homing Devices in Choice of Tort Law: Australian, British and Canadian 
Approaches’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 839 lists cases that have 
subsequently considered international statutes of limitation (p860) and intranational damages provisions 
(p861), and notes the faithful application of the Pfeiffer regime in these areas in subsequent decisions. 
It can fairly be said there have been real difference of opinion on this issue in England 
over the years.  Perhaps the best evidence of this is found in a comparison of the 
discussion of the issue in one of the leading texts.  While Dicey in the first edition of his 
conflict of laws text states that English lawyers give ‘the widest possible extension to the 
meaning of the term ‘procedure’,58 by the time the fourteenth edition is printed, the view 
is that  
 
the practice of giving a broad scope to the classification of a matter as procedural has fallen into disfavour 
because of the tendency to frustrate the purposes of choice of law rules.59
 
On this basis, the learned authors conclude that the measure of damages should not 
necessarily be procedural.60
 
Several recent cases have directly raised the distinction, providing illustrations of the 
current English approach to such difficulties.  In terms of the orthodox view in England 
as to the boundary between substance and procedure, the position (like that taken in 
Stevens in Australia) has since early legal times61 been that the issue of the heads of 
damage available to a successful plaintiff is a matter of substance, while the issue of 
quantification of damages is a matter of procedure for the law of the forum.62   
 
One should note here that each of the English cases to be considered was decided after 
the introduction of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 
(United Kingdom).63  Section 14(3)(b) of that Act provides that nothing in Part III 
authorizes questions of procedure in any proceedings to be determined otherwise than in 
accordance with the law of the forum.  In other words, the Act apparently64 reflects the 
previous common law position that questions of procedure are governed by the law of the 
                                                 
58 Conflict of Laws (1896) p712 
59 Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (2006) 14th ed p177 (presumably a reference to the 
goal of the conflict of laws being to fulfil foreign rights, or perhaps to have cross-border cases dealt with by 
reference to the most appropriate legal system on offer).  Janeen Carruthers makes the same point:  
‘Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws: A Continuing Debate in Relation to Damages’ (2004) 53 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 691, 710 
60 P194 
61 Eg Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1, 28-29: ‘the law is clear that, if the foreign law touches only the 
remedy or procedure for enforcing the obligation … such law is no bar to an action in this country’; Huber 
v Steiner (1835) 2 Bing NC 203; De La Vega v Vianna (1830) 1 Bard & Ad 284; Robinson v Bland (1760) 
2 Burr 1077 
62 Chaplin v Boys [1971] AC 356, 379 (Lord Hodson, subject to a flexible exception), Lord Guest (381), 
Lord Wilberforce (393), Lord Pearson stating that forum law must govern remedies ‘to some extent at 
least’ (394), Lord Donovan merely stating that the forum court ‘should award its own remedies’. 
63 Adrian Briggs ‘Choice of Law in Tort and Delict’ (1995) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarterly 519 
64 Andrew Scott, ‘Substance and Procedure and Choice of Law in Torts’ (2007) Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 44, 47 suggests three possible views: (a) an intention to recast the rules; (b) an 
intention to defer to the common law concept of procedure, leaving the concept free to develop in light of 
private international law’s principles, or (c) an intention to incorporate the common law concept, as it was 
understood in 1995. 
forum,65 and that quantification of damages was a matter of procedure.66  That this is the 
effect of the Act was confirmed by the House of Lords in its Harding decision.67
 
The case of Edmunds v Simmonds68 involved a car accident between a rental vehicle and 
a truck in Spain.  The rental vehicle was being driven by the defendant, with the plaintiff 
a passenger in the vehicle.  The plaintiff and defendant were both English residents who 
were on holidays in Spain.  The car was insured with a Spanish insurer.  The court was 
satisfied the accident was the defendant’s fault, and the only remaining issue was how 
damages were to be assessed.  The available heads of damage were similar in England 
and Spain, but the way in which quantum was assessed differed.69
 
The court accepted the orthodox view that heads of damage were matters of substantive 
law, to be governed by the law of the cause.  However, issues of quantification were 
matters of procedure, a matter for English courts as the forum court here.70
 
The rule was also applied in Roerig v Valiant Trawlers Ltd,71 involving an accident on a 
trawler registered in England and owned by the defendant, an English registered 
company but a subsidiary of a Dutch company.  The deceased, a Dutchman, was on board 
the trawler as an employee of a Dutch company that was part of the same group.  The 
vessel was on a Dutch fishing expedition in that the boat set off from a Dutch port and 
would return its catch to a Dutch port. 
 
Again, the issue arose as to the quantification of damages available to the deceased’s wife.  
Under English law, damages would be assessed without taking into account other 
benefits the deceased’s wife might have obtained as a result of the accident, for example 
a life insurance policy.  However under Dutch law, this was a relevant factor, and any 
court-ordered damages would be reduced by the extent to which the claimant had been 
compensated elsewhere for losses arising from the accident.  The court, applying the 
orthodox view, found that the issue of what amounts could be deducted from damages 
ordered by the court was an issue of quantum, traditionally governed by the law of the 
                                                 
65 C G J Morse ‘Torts in Private International Law: A New Statutory Framework’ (1996) 45 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 889,895 
66 That this was intended by the drafters of the legislation was confirmed by the Lord Chancellor, Lord 
Mackay of Clashfern, in his speech to the House:  Hansard (House of Lords Debates) 27/3/1995, columns 
1421-1422 and in the Report that eventually led to the legislative reform: Report of the Law Commission 
and the Scottish Law Commission Private International Law: Choice of Law in Tort and Delict  (Law Com 
No 193, Scot Law Com No 129)(1990) para 3.38 ‘the measure or quantification of damages under those 
heads (should be) governed by the lex fori’.  This conclusion is referred to by Lord Hoffmann in Harding, 
para 34.  
67 [2006] 3 WLR 83 
68 [2001] 1 WLR 1003 
69 Specifically, the English means of assessing quantum was much more generous than the Spanish means. 
70 This distinction was an obiter observation, with the court preferring to base its reasoning on the ground 
that the law of the place of the wrong (Spain) should be displaced as the substantive law because given the 
parties’ connections, it was substantially more appropriate that the matter be dealt with under British law 
(applying s11-12 of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions Act) 1995 (UK)). 
71 [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 681 
forum, here English law.  As a result, damages were not reduced to take account of the 
other payments the claimant had received. 
 
Again in Hulse v Chambers,72 the court found that in relation to English plaintiffs injured 
in a motor vehicle accident in Greece, Greek law applied to the heads of damage 
available, but English law as the law of the forum governed how damages were to be 
assessed. 
 
In Harding v Wealands,73  the plaintiff, resident in England, was injured while travelling 
in a vehicle being driven by the defendant in New South Wales.  The defendant was 
living with the plaintiff in England and employed in England at the time of the accident.  
He claimed compensation for his injuries in an English court.  Negligence was admitted; 
the case revolved around the question of remedies, and in particular whether the statutory 
compensation scheme operative in New South Wales at the relevant time was applicable, 
or whether the common law English principles of compensation were applicable.  The 
statutory scheme included provisions dealing with capping of compensation, the discount 
rate, how compensation must be reduced for insurance payments to the plaintiff, and 
when interest on damages is payable.  The House of Lords overturned the decision of the 
Court of Appeal74 that the New South Wales statutory provisions should be applied in the 
assessment of damages. 
 
Lord Hoffmann (with whom Lords Bingham, Woolf and Rodger agreed) stated there was 
no intention that the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 
override the previous common law rules maintaining that quantum of damages was a 
matter for forum law.75  He then referred to Stevens v Head, especially the view of the 
majority there that the relevant New South Wales statutory provisions were concerned 
with quantification rather than heads of damage.  As a result, they were not applicable to 
this proceeding.  Lord Hoffmann postulated, however, that the new position arrived at in 
Australia in Pfeiffer (a case that overruled Stevens), that the definition of what is 
procedural should be narrowly confined to rules governing or regulating the mode or 
conduct or court proceedings, may for some ‘appear to be more logical’.76  It had been 
adopted by the Court of Appeal (Arden LJ and Sir William Aldous, Waller LJ 
dissenting).77  The Court of Appeal referred with approval to the developments of the 
                                                 
72 [2001] 1 WLR 2386 
73 [2006] 3 WLR 83 
74 The Court of Appeal decision is discussed at some length in Janeen Carruthers ‘Damages in the Conflict 
of Laws – The Substance and Procedure Spectrum: Harding v Wealands (2005) 1 Journal of Private 
International Law 323; the House of Lords decision is discussed in Charles Dougherty ‘Private 
International Law: Harding v Wealands’ (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 443   
75 Established in the difficult case of  Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356 (difficult because there is no actual 
ratio for the decision, and it has been partly overruled) 
76 Para 51 
77 Arden LJ thought for example that any reference to the law of the forum was exceptional; it was limited 
to cases where it was impossible to apply the foreign law to the issue.  Sir William Aldous sought to give 
the word ‘procedure’ its natural meaning, unencumbered by the previous case law on point.  In the House 
of Lords, Lord Carswell agreed with the view that damages are not naturally regarded as procedure; 
however since he believed that ‘procedure’ in the context of private international law had a meaning 
Australian law in this area in Pfeiffer.  He thought that this path was denied to the English 
courts by the clear expression of the will of the British Parliament in 1995.78  As a result, 
the result in the United Kingdom continued to be that quantification of damages was for 
the law of the forum, with the availability of heads of damage a matter for the substantive 
law of the cause.  This could lead to the result, as Scott and Mortensen point out, that 
English (and other British) courts may be asked to apply English rules to quantify losses 
which are not actionable in England.79  It is an invitation to forum shoppers.   
 
The House expressed satisfaction that quantification was a matter for English courts 
because 
 
It shows that Parliament was assured that the provision would prevent damages being awarded by reference 
to the law and standards of other countries.  The particular problem raised by Lord Howie related to the 
high level of damages in the United States which he was anxious should not be replicated here.  But it 
would be equally unacceptable if, say, United Kingdom courts had to award damages according to a 
statutory scale which, while adequate in another country because of the relative low cost of services etc 
there, would be wholly inadequate in this country, having regard to the cost of corresponding items here.  
As Parliament was assured by the Lord Chancellor, (the 1995 Act) guards against such eventualities.80
 
Members of the House of Lords suggested that the word ‘procedure’ might have a special 
meaning in the context of private international law, and that the Act intended the word to 
be defined in that context, rather than a more general context.81
 
This understanding of Parliament’s intention may be questioned on the basis that the 
intent of the Act was clearly to overturn the substantive choice of law principles in tort in 
                                                                                                                                                 
different from its typical usage, he was able to join in the reasoning of the other Lords in re-affirming that 
quantification of damages was a procedural matter for the law of the forum. 
78 He referred to a speech made by the Lord Chancellor during the debate over the 1995, where the Lord 
clarified that it was intended that after the passage of the Act, the law of the forum would continue to 
govern the question of quantum or measure of damages.  This view is supported by the Report of the Law 
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission (Private International Law: Choice of Law in Tort and 
Delict (Law Com No 193, Scot Law Com 129)), 1990 para 3.38 ‘The consultation paper … provisionally 
recommended that there should be no change in the present law on the question of damages, which we 
confirm.  Accordingly, the applicable law in tort or delict determines the question of availability of 
particular heads of damages whereas the measure or quantification of damages under those heads is 
governed by the lex fori’. 
79 Andrew Scott ‘Substance and Procedure and Choice of Law in Torts’ (2007) Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 44, 59; Reid Mortensen ‘Homing Devices in Choice of Tort Law: Australian, 
British and Canadian Approaches’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 839, 875 
80 Lord Rodger, para 70; I have referred elsewhere to my dislike of decisions on which law to apply being 
based on whether we ‘like’ what the foreign law does, given its potential for fully-fledged application of 
the law of the forum, and abrogation of the purpose of choice of law rules, which is to fulfil foreign rights:  
see Anthony Gray ‘Remedy Issues in Multinational Tort Claims’ (2007) 26(1) University of Queensland 
Law Journal 1, 3-6.  In other words, the argument is that English courts should apply their own remedies 
because the result is more attuned with what the English judge thinks is fair compensation.  However, what 
if the foreign law as the law of the place of the wrong does not recognise the cause of action at all?  We do 
not in such cases allow the forum court to ignore this because we might not like the result, yet some judges 
are prepared to ignore the extent of the remedy provided by the law of the cause because they may not like 
the outcome.  It seems inconsistent and not what choice of law rules are designed to achieve. 
81 Lords Rodger (para 65) and Carswell (83) 
the United Kingdom.  Could this not also suggest an intention to draw afresh the 
boundaries between substance and procedure?  As Scott argues 
 
It appears rather unreasonable to attribute to Parliament the rather absurd intention to incorporate and 
preserve a body of common law rules developed in the context of an entirely different choice of law 
scheme for torts.82
 
The approach of both the Court of Appeal and House of Lords, in characterizing the 
legislation rather than the issue itself, has been the subject of note and criticism by 
authors.83  The approach adopted was not orthodox in relation to such questions. 
 
The decision is also open to criticism that it would have led to inconsistencies depending 
on whether actions are brought in contract or tort.  This possibility arises given Article 10 
of the Rome Convention, implemented by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 (UK).  
The Article provides that the proper law shall govern the consequences of breach, 
including the assessment of damages.  While the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Harding would render the rules regarding assessment of damages in contract and tort 
consistent, the effect of the House of Lords decision is to create different rules for 
assessment of damages in both contexts.  One might question the desirability of such an 
outcome, most especially in cases of a concurrence of liability in contract and tort.84   
 
Subsequent to the decision being handed down, Regulation EC 864/2007 (Rome II) was 
made on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations.  OJ2007, L199/40, 
effective from 11 January 2009, now makes it clear that the applicable law governs ‘the 
existence, nature and assessment of damage or the remedy claimed.85  As a result, the 
effect of the Harding decision, at least in the United Kingdom, has largely86 been 
neutered by statute, unless the Convention is interpreted in an unexpected way.   
 
As we will further discuss, many regard the distinction between the right and the remedy 
to be artificial.  If the right is a matter of substance, arguably so too should all issues 
pertaining to the remedy.87
                                                 
82 Andrew Scott ‘Substance and Procedure and Choice of Law in Torts’ [2007] Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 44.   He suggests the intention was merely to preserve the distinction between 
procedure and substance, leaving the common law to specify the boundary between those categories and 
their contents (50). 
83 Andrew Scott ‘Substance and Procedure in Choice of Law in Torts’ (2007) Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 44, 47; George Panagopoulos ‘Substance and Procedure in Private 
International Law’ (2005) 1 Journal of Private International Law 69, 74 
84 Admittedly, the Harding case itself was not such a case.  Similar criticism appears in Charles Dougherty 
and Lucy Wyles ‘Current Developments – Private International Law’ (2007) 56 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 443, 451 
85 Refer for example to Symeon Symeonides ‘Rome II and Tort Conflicts: A Missed Opportunity’ (2008) 
56 American Journal of Comparative Law 1; Paul Beaumont and T Zang ‘Classification of Delictual 
Damages – Harding v Wealands and the Rome II Regulation’ (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 131 
86 However, even after Rome II, defamation claims are still assessed under the common law, so Harding 
would still apply to that extent. 
87 Brian Opeskin ‘Statutory Caps in Australian Conflict of Laws’ (1993) 109 Law Quarterly Review 533, 
537; Reid Mortensen ‘Homing Devices in Choice of Tort Law: Australian, British and Canadian 
Approaches’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 839, 876; Charles Dougherty and 
 
(c) Canada and South Africa 
In Tolofson v Jensen,88 a narrow definition was given to procedure.  Citing the reason for 
the rule, the Canadian Supreme Court confined procedural rules to those that existed for 
the convenience of the court, administering the court’s ‘machinery as distinguished from 
its product’.  Limitation periods were held to be substantive. 
 
However, since that case we have seen some retreat back to the law of the forum.  A 
recent example is Somers v Fournier,89 where the Ontario Court of Appeal considered an 
accident in New York.  The forum court applied New York law as the law of the place of 
the wrong, yet applied the local Canadian statute capping damages for non-pecuniary loss, 
on the basis that it is procedural.  This was justified on the basis that the caps reflected a 
policy to avoid or limit payouts for non-pecuniary damages.  It was a device to avoid 
excessive and unpredictable damages awards for non-pecuniary losses.90
 
More recently in Vogler v Szendroi,91 the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal disregarded part 
of the law of the place of the wrong, Wyoming, in a motor vehicle accident claim brought 
in Nova Scotia.  A Wyoming rule provided for the date at which a proceeding would be 
deemed to have commenced for limitation of actions purposes.  This was different from 
the date in Nova Scotian law.  Had the Wyoming law been applied, the action would have 
been out of time.  However, the judge in Nova Scotia decided that the Wyoming 
provision was merely procedural and so not applicable to the claim brought in Halifax, 
Nova Scotia.  He found that the Wyoming provision related to methodology, or the 
manner in which an action is deemed commenced, rather than timing, or the deadline 
within which action must be commenced.92  The judge also referred to what he called 
policy-based considerations.93
                                                                                                                                                 
Lucy Wyles ‘Private International Law: Current Developments’ (2007) 56 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 443, 451; George Panagopoulos ‘Substance and Procedure in Private International Law’ 
(2005) 1 Journal of Private International Law 69, 77-78 citing Phrantzes v Argenti [1960] 2 QB 19 for the 
proposition that a remedy is an inseparable component of a right or obligation.  Lord Parker CJ noted in 
that case that ‘the remedies available must harmonise with the right according to its nature and extent as 
fixed by foreign law’ (36-37). 
88 [1994] 3 SCR 1022 
89 (2002) 214 DLR (4th) 611; subsequently accepted in Craig v Allstate Insurance Co of Canada (2002) 214 
DLR (4th) 103, 113 
90 This sounds to the author like an assertion that forum law provides a remedy that the forum court prefers, 
which the author argues should not be a reason for failing to apply the law of the place of the wrong:  see 
Anthony Gray ‘Remedy Issues in Multinational Tort Claims’ (2007) 26(1) University of Queensland Law 
Journal, 1, 3-6 
91 [2008] NSCA 18 
92 In rejecting an argument that the Wyoming provision was related to statutes of limitation (themselves 
acknowledged to be substantive) because the commencing words of the rule were ‘for purposes of statutes 
of limitation’, the judge found that the introductory words merely identified the rationale for the provision, 
but did not have the effect that the provision was substantive (pars 35). 
93 These included that (in the context of the facts of the case) the question of limitations only arose due to 
the commencement of a claim in accord with the rules of the forum, because the vagaries of service abroad 
may reduce a claimant’s ability to ensure this occurs in a timely fashion, and because it was unlikely that 
the foreign limitation period would be designed to accommodate the delay that could occur in the service of 
documents for foreign proceedings (para 38).  On the other hand, the Wyoming statute did not distinguish 
 
In a recent South African case, the familiar distinction between limitation periods that 
extinguish the right and those that bar the remedy raised its (ugly) head.94  The court was 
critical of such an approach, in a situation where a ‘gap’ was created in that the law of the 
cause viewed limitation periods as procedural, for the law of the forum, while the law of 
the forum viewed limitation periods as substantive, for the law of the cause.  The court 
there resolved the impasse by applying the law of the cause, namely England, to the 
question of limitations periods.  In so doing, the court declared (correctly, the author 
asserts), that international uniformity of decisions was very important, and would require 
that claims alive and enforceable according to the law of the cause ought not be defeated 
if brought in a different forum.  Regardless of whether the relevant limitation periods 
extinguished the right or merely barred the remedy, English law had the closer 
connection with the creation, operation, interpretation and enforcement of the parties’ 
rights.  Logically it should apply. 
 
The Future  
The writer believes that the approach of the recent English and Canadian cases has not 
been correct.  The distinction between substance and procedure has some merit, and 
should be retained.95  However, the line to be drawn in the area of assessment of damages 
is a matter of continuing debate.  Quantification of damages for breach of contract has 
also usually been regarded as substantive,96 and (as argued earlier) it is questioned 
whether it is legitimate to classify the matter in different ways according to whether the 
dispute is related to contract or tort. 
 
(a) Reasons for the Past Broad View of Procedure 
In terms of the precedent supporting the orthodox distinction between heads of damage 
(substantive) and quantification of damage (procedural), to the extent that such precedent 
is based on Chaplin v Boys one would have to question its continued relevance.97  The 
Chaplin decision itself is a difficult one, with various strands of reasoning and no 
                                                                                                                                                 
on its face between service of documents for foreign proceedings and local proceedings.  Prima facie it 
applied to both.  The first reason given would justify greater resort to the law of the forum, since all issues 
only arise due to the commencement of a claim in accord with the rules of the forum – this reasoning could 
also justify using forum law to govern heads of damage and even liability, because these issues pursuant to 
proceedings in the forum.  It is admitted that the vagaries of service abroad is an issue, but seems less of a 
concern when the statute of limitation is four years.  It may be different if a short time frame were given 
within which to commence action. 
94 Society of Lloyds v Price; Society of Lloyd’s v Lee [2006] SCA 87 
95 cf Lord Wilberforce in Black-Clawson Ltd v Papierwerke AG [1975] AC 591,632 who noted that ‘for 
English law to abolish the distinction between substance and procedure … might be an intelligible 
objective’; and Chamberlayne ‘The distinction between substance and procedure is artificial and illusory.  
In essence, there is none.  The remedy and the predetermined machinery, so far as the litigant has a 
recognized claim to use it are, legally speaking, part of the right itself (Evidence, 1911, para 171) 
96 Ekins v East India Co (1717) 24 ER 441 
97 In the case, Lord Hodson found that quantification of damages was a question of procedure (378-
379)(citing two cases but no justification), Lord Guest relied on the same cases (381).  Lord Donovan said 
the forum should award its own remedies (no authority or reasoning provided), as did Lord Wilberforce 
(393)(no authority or reasoning provided).  Lord Pearson did not directly address the issue, but suggested 
an exception if the law of the place of the wrong were applied as the substantive law, so that an English 
court could award ‘adequate damages’ (in its opinion)(406). 
unifying rationale.  Most of the overall precedent value of the case has subsequently been 
eroded by legislation, the Parliament obviously finding it necessary to change the law as 
it stood after the Chaplin case, at least to some extent.98  Rome II does not adopt this 
approach.  This is not a vote of confidence in the decision.99   
 
In terms of rationale, there is the odd reference to the old forms of action as relating to 
the remedy sought, so a possible link is made between the forum in which the action was 
heard and questions of remedy.100  A particular court, which might hear actions of a 
particular form, was also restricted in the kinds of remedy it might provide.  As Cook 
notes ‘many rules of modern substantive law had their origin in procedural devices’.101  
Perhaps thus, the link between remedies and form (formality/procedure) was created.  
Such reasoning might have been applicable when the forms of action were important; 
obviously such reasoning is no longer applicable now. 
 
Fundamentally, the purpose of the distinction must be borne in mind.  It is not a 
mathematical formula to be unthinkingly applied.  The author can only agree with Cook 
who sees ‘The no-man’s land, the twilight zone of our classification, where a decision 
one way or the other is in the abstract equally possible or logical’.  Cook claims that ‘ 
no intelligent conclusion can be reached in any particular case until the fundamental 
purpose for which the classification is being made is taken into consideration’.102
 
However, one will look in vain to see a justification (other than precedent) for the 
different treatment of heads of damage on the one hand, and quantum on the other, in the 
Chaplin case.  Let us accept that the distinction between substance and procedure relates 
to practical convenience, and how far one can reasonably expect a court to go in adopting 
the law of the cause without unduly inconveniencing itself.  If so, why is it practically 
convenient to consider the different heads of damage that the law of the cause will allow, 
but practically inconvenient to consider how the law of the cause will calculate the 
damages? 
 
It is possible that the differential treatment of damages, with part being governed by the 
law of the cause and part by the law of the forum, parallels too closely the courts’ past 
adherence to double actionability in Phillips v Eyre, and reflects an understandable but 
unacceptable desire to want to give to the law of the forum (read England) influence over 
                                                 
98 The Privy Council also took a different approach in Red Sea, casting further doubt on the continuing 
acceptance of Boys, for whichever principle for which the case was said to stand.  However, the distinction 
between substance and procedure was not an issue in the former case. 
99 In the judgment  of one of the above English cases, Roerig, the English Court of Appeal declares the 
judgment of the majority in Stevens v Head ‘compelling’ (687).  However, that decision, at least in so far as 
it relates to events connected wholly within Australia, can no longer after Pfeiffer be regarded as good law 
in Australia. 
100 Walter Wheeler Cook ‘Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws’ (1933) 42 Yale Law Journal 
333, 349, referring to Goodrich. 
101 402 
102 Walter Wheeler Cook ‘Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws’ (1933) 42 Yale Law Journal 
333, 352 and 356 
remedies, just as there was a desire to give English law influence over choice of law 
generally.   
 
I am far from alone in this belief.  In Australia, Dixon CJ in Maxwell v Murphy103 refers 
to the ‘inveterate tendency of English law to regard some matters as evidentiary or 
procedural which in reality must operate to impair or destroy rights in substance’.  Deane 
J in Breavington referred to orthodox conflicts rules as ‘show(ing) undue preference for 
the substantive law of the forum’.104   Kirby J has noted the previous ‘dominant position 
of Britain in the world also led to the temptation, not always resisted, to consider that 
British laws were superior to those of other lands’.105  Lord Wilberforce himself in Boys 
referred to the substance and procedure distinction, noted it could sometimes be a fine 
line, and then claimed that ‘a not insubstantial weight,  perhaps unconscious in its use, is 
to be found in a policy preference for the adopted (in other words, preferred) solution, 
when judges are called on to draw the line.106  La Forest J also referred to these trends in 
his landmark judgment in Tolofson v Jensen.107
 
In the related context108 of whether a forum non conveniens application should succeed, 
one member of the House of Lords would consider whether the plaintiff would obtain 
‘justice’ in the foreign jurisdiction.109  This invites a judgment by the court of the merits 
of the laws of another country, and a comparison between English remedies and foreign 
remedies.110  This is not an exercise this author commends,111 due to the principle of 
judicial comity and respect for legal systems other than our own.   
 
                                                 
103 (1957) 96 CLR at267 
104 p125.  See also Janeen Carruthers ‘Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws: A Continuing 
Debate in Relation to Damages’ (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 691,710 ‘Self 
promotion on the part of any forum foments reluctance to concede that foreign rules are substantive and 
encourages litigants to indulge in the vice of forum shopping’, and A H Robertson Characterisation in the 
Conflict of Laws (1940) stating that a forum ‘should endeavour to exercise a spirit of self-restraint, not self-
promotion, for the ‘whole foundation of the conflict of laws requires that a court should restrict the field of 
its own procedure and be prepared to follow as far as possible the foreign substantive law’ (247). 
105 Pfeiffer, 547.  He added that ‘such considerations, and the ready familiarity of judges with the laws of 
their own forum, made it natural to expound and apply a choice of law rule that would enhance the role of 
the courts and law of the forum and diminish the significance of the foreign law of the place where the 
alleged wrong had occurred’.  He made similar comments in Zhang, p531. 
106 392.  His Honour them claimed there was ‘some artifice in regarding a man’s right to recover damages 
for pain and suffering as a matter of procedure’ (393).  Similarly, Lord Hodson conceded that ‘it is 
expected that a court will favour its own policies over those of other states and be inclined to give its own 
rules a wider application than it will give to those of other states’ (380). 
107 [1994] 3 SCR 1022 
108 They are related because one of the factors to be taken into account in assessing a forum non conveniens 
application is the relevant law that would be applied to resolve the dispute: Spiliada Maritime Corp v 
Cansulex Ltd [1987] 1 AC 460 
109 Lord Goff in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460,478 
110 The author respectfully agrees with the comment by the High Court in Voth (Mason CJ Deane Dawson 
and Gaudron JJ) that ‘there are powerful policy considerations which militate against Australian courts 
sitting in judgment upon the ability or willingness of the courts of another country to accord justice to the 
plaintiff in the particular case’ (559).   
111 Refer to Anthony Gray ‘Remedy Issues in Multinational Tort Claims: Fashioning a Choice of Law Rule’ 
(2007) 26(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 1 
Some have argued, given a territorial based rule of law, that arguments about forum 
policy are more appropriate when questions of jurisdiction arise.112  However, this 
suggestion is particularly difficult when a jurisdiction’s forum non conveniens rule is 
particularly strict, as it is, for instance, in Australia.113  It presents difficulties in Europe 
also given that if an English domiciled defendant commits a tort in a country to which the 
Brussels Regulation applies, a local claimant has the right to invoke the jurisdiction either 
of local or English courts.114
 
(b) The Suggested Narrow Definition of Procedure 
Given the belated abandonment of the requirement of actionability by forum law in 
Britain and now Australia,115 the author agrees with the Rome II approach that we must 
abandon resorting to the law of the forum in assessing the quantum of damages, contrary 
to what has occurred recently in English and Canadian courts.116  It cannot be justified 
when the purpose of the distinction is borne in mind.  This purpose is either to 
 
(a) consider how far the forum court could go in applying the rules taken from the 
foreign system of law without unduly hindering or inconveniencing itself;117 
and/or 
(b) increase the efficiency of litigation by allowing judges to adopt familiar rules of 
practice and procedure, in other words those regulating or governing the mode or 
conduct of court proceedings118 
 
In related discussion, Cook defined matters of substance as ‘rules which determine which 
facts have certain specified legal consequences’.119  Lorenzen believed that rules of the 
                                                 
112 Tolofson v Jensen [1994] 3 SCR 1022, 1054-1055 
113 Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538  
114 Regulation EC 44/2001; Owusu v Jackson (Case C-281/02) [2005] 1 ECR 1383; [2005] 2 WLR 942; 
Adrian Briggs ‘Forum Non Conveniens and Ideal Europeans’ [2005] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial 
Law Quarterly 378; ‘The Death of Harrods: Forum Non Conveniens and the European Court’ (2004) 121 
Law Quarterly Review 535; Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 22/12/00 on Civil Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment in Civil and Commercial Matters, Article 5(3) 
115 Of course, the old common law continues to apply to defamation claims in Great Britain.  New Zealand 
continues as one of the few countries continuing to adhere to the double actionability rule.  Refer for 
example to Baxter v RMC Group PLC [2003] 1 NZLR 304; Starlink Navigation Ltd v The Ship ‘Seven 
Prince’ [2001] 16 PRNZ 55 
116 The qualifier must be added that Rome II has not yet come into effect, nor has it been interpreted by the 
Courts as yet, hence its impact in changing the law in this area remains untested at this time. 
117 the Cook formulation, n20;  similar was the Canadian Supreme Court in Tolofson v Jensen [1994] 3 
SCR 1022, 1071-1072 that the purpose of the distinction was to ‘determine which rules will make the 
machinery of the forum court run smoothly as distinguished from those determinative of the rights of both 
parties’. 
118 broadly, the Mason CJ Deane and Gaudron JJ line in McKain.  This is supported in another context by 
John Salmond in his book on Jurisprudence (1924) 7th ed ‘the law of procedure may be defined as that 
branch of the law which governs the process of litigation … the substantive law defines the remedy and the 
right, while the law of procedure defines the modes and conditions of the application of the one to the other 
(405-406) 
119 354 
law of the cause (substantive law) included all rules that ‘bear substantially upon the 
rights of the parties’.120
 
It is submitted that the question of what is ‘undue hindrance and inconvenience’ is too 
uncertain to be of much use.  Of course, we must always guard against the homing 
instincts of judges in these cases.121  As Janeen Carruthers notes  
 
The inconvenience argument has been applied by English and Scots courts in a restrictive, forum-preferring 
manner which, if we are honest, has policy and homeward trend as its root122
 
As she further notes, the argument becomes circular, because in situations where a head 
of damage is not known to forum law, surely application of quantification methods of the 
foreign law of the cause (subject to public policy restrictions) would be more 
‘convenient’ than the application of some principle of forum law. 
 
For this reason, the more workable suggestion seems to be the second, given its more 
precise formulation.  It was the approach favoured by the High Court of Australia in 
Pfeiffer, and by the dissenting judges in McKain and Stevens.  There is not a great deal of 
difference between the two formulations, in that they are likely to lead to the same result 
in most cases.   
 
Whichever formulation is adopted, there is no justification whatsoever in treating matters 
of the quantification of damages as procedural.  Clearly, they do not relate to the mode or 
conduct of proceedings, and it would be unlikely to be an ‘undue hindrance’ to apply 
them.  Applying the test then of confining procedural matters to those associated with the 
efficiency of litigation and allow judges to use familiar rules of practice and procedure, 
the High Court of Australia was correct in Pfeiffer, and the Supreme Court of South 
Africa was correct in Price, to abandon the distinction between limitation periods which 
extinguish the right and those which bar the remedy.  Both kinds should be viewed as 
being substantive, governed by the law of the cause.  It would not be unduly burdensome 
to determine and apply the limitation period of the law of the place of the wrong, nor 
would it lead to inefficiency of litigation to apply such a limitation period.123   
 
To the extent that the reference to quantification of damages being procedural was tied to 
double actionability, it can no longer be accepted given the abolition of that rule, in the 
United Kingdom by legislation, and in Australia and Canada by superior court 
jurisprudence.  This assertion is itself contentious, because the House of Lords most 
recently in Harding concluded that the intention of the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (UK), though clearly to abolish the requirement of 
double actionability in most cases, was not to disturb the pre-existing common law 
                                                 
120 Note in (1933) 47 Harvard Law Review 315 
121 Reid Mortensen ‘Homing Devices in Choice of Tort Law: Australian, British and Canadian Approaches’ 
(2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 839 
122 ‘Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws: A Continuing Debate in Relation to Damages’ (2004) 
53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 691, 709 
123 Mason CJ in McKain acknowledged that the text of a limitation statute ‘would be readily available’ (27). 
position that the question of heads of damage was one of substance, with the question of 
quantification one of procedure for the forum. 
 
(c) Rights and Remedies Should Not be Separated 
How tenable is this assertion that the right and the remedy are not (necessarily) linked, as 
the House of Lords most recently insisted? 
 
There is a range of opinion, not to say logic, to the contrary.  Ailes claimed it was 
‘improper to speak of remedies as existing anterior to substantive rights.  The one 
necessarily involves the other’.124  He claimed that in the long history of Roman law, 
right and remedy were never sharply dissociated, and there was no evidence that Roman 
law was any the worse as a result.  Holmes stated that a substantive right was ‘only the 
hypostasis of a prophecy – the imagination of a substance supporting the fact that the 
public force will be brought to bear upon those who do things said to contravene it’.125  
Panagopoulos concluded that the remedy is an integral part of the right being enforced 
that should not be segregated.126  Particularly in the negligence context, Kirby J has noted 
recently that damage is the gist of the action.127  Deane J in McKain v Millar concluded 
that the existence and extent of a remedy is commonly accepted as an incident and 
measure of a right.128  If the object of choice of law principles is to fulfil foreign rights, 
as Mason CJ said in Stevens v Head,129 it is difficult to see why a distinction should be 
made between the ascertainment of the right and the remedy it provides.  
 
The distinction was criticized in Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank 
(London): 
 
Right and remedy are indissolubly connected and correlated … it is as idle to ask whether the court 
vindicates the suitor’s substantive right or gives a suitor a procedural remedy as to ask whether thought is a 
mental or cerebral process130
 
It seems artificial and arbitrary to draw a line between the right and the remedy.  It is 
reminiscent of the kind of reasoning used to maintain the distinction between different 
kinds of limitation periods, since abandoned.  It has no place in modern choice of law 
                                                 
124 Edgar Ailes ‘Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws’ (1941) 39 Michigan Law Review 392, 
403 
125 Oliver Wendell Holmes ‘Natural Law’ in Collected Legal Papers (1920) 310, 313; Peter Birks is also 
against it:  ‘Rights, Wrongs and Remedies’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 
126 ‘Substance and Procedure in Private International Law’ (2005) 1 Journal of Private International Law 
69, 78, citing Phrantzes v Argenti [1960] 2 QB 19 for the proposition that for the purposes of private 
international law, the remedy is an inseparable component of the right or obligation.  (This cannot be 
reconciled with the 2006 House of Lords decision in Harding, however). 
127 BHP Billiton Limited v Schultz and Others (2004) 221 CLR 400, 460  
128 (1991) 174 CLR 1, 48 ‘the unavailability of a remedy by reason of a limitation period will ordinarily be 
of immeasurably greater significance than the theoretical persistence of the underlying right’;  Mason CJ 
and Gaudron J expressed similar sentiments).  These three judges were dissenting in this case, but the 
majority decision was subsequently overturned in Pfeiffer. 
129 Para 20 
130 [1981] Ch 105, 124 (Goudling J); see also J D’Almeida Araujo Ltd v Sir Frederick Becker and Co Ltd 
[1953] 2 QB 329 
rules.  The remedy only arises when the right is recognized; one cannot have one without 
the other.  Upon what logic then should they be distinguished? 
 
(d) Forum Shopping is Undesirable 
However, an argument for a narrow definition of what is procedural is not justified 
merely because of the purpose of the distinction – it can be justified on other grounds.  As 
is obvious, the narrower the definition, the less scope there is for an opportunistic 
plaintiff to forum shop in order to find a forum most advantageous to his case.131  One 
cannot blame parties in litigation for so doing, but the law should surely not encourage a 
person injured in one jurisdiction to sue in another, and by so doing avoid inconvenient 
damages limitations or time bars.132  As Panagopoulos puts it 
 
What the court should seek to do, at least in theory, is reach the same result as the foreign court in respect 
of the specific juridical issue to which the relevant choice of law rule applies133
 
In other words, what is procedural should be kept to a minimum to avoid forum 
shopping.134
 
Of course, forum shopping completely undermines the territorial basis of choice of law 
rules that have now been settled in most jurisdictions, often after long and tortuous paths.  
It is considered to be a very serious distortion of the whole object of choice of law rules, 
and should not be tolerated, let along encouraged, by choices we make about what is 
substance and what is procedure.  Judges have commented on the undesirable nature of 
forum shopping in this context.135
 
                                                 
131 Further, surely forum shopping remains objectionable whether it occurs within a country or across 
different countries. 
132 This occurred in Stevens v Head and McKain v Miller and was attempted in Breavington v Godleman.  
However, in support of the majority view in McKain and Stevens, see Richard York ‘Let it Be: The 
Approach of the High Court of Australia to Substance and Procedure in Stevens v Head’ (1994) 16 Sydney 
Law Review 403 
133 George Panagopoulos ‘Substance and Procedure in Private International Law’ (2005) 1 Journal of 
Private International Law 69, 73 
134 Others defend forum shopping: see for example Andrew Bell ‘The Why and Wherefore of Transnational 
Forum Shopping’ (1995) 69 Australian Law Journal 124; Friedrich Juenger ‘What’s Wrong With Forum 
Shopping?’ (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 5; in this context Mason CJ and Deane J in Stevens v Head 
(1992) 176 CLR 433, 442 and 462 (and Gaudron J at 466) and McKain v R W Miller and Co (SA) Pty Ltd 
(1991) 174 CLR 1, 25 and 50  referred to forum shopping as something that choice of law rules should not 
encourage.  
135 For example, Stevens v Head (1992) 176 CLR 433, 442 per Mason CJ ‘I was concerned that a resolution 
of the conflicts problem in such cases which gave too much prominence to the lex fori would inevitably 
encourage forum shopping by plaintiffs’; Deane J ‘the approach adopted by the majority in McKain (giving 
procedure a broad definition) goes a long way towards converting the Australian legal system into a 
national market in which forum shoppers are encouraged to select between competing laws imposing 
different legal consequences in respect of a single occurrence’ (462); and in Pfeiffer, Kirby J (552-553) and 
Callinan J (570-571); refer to La Forest J in Tolofson v Jensen ‘To permit the court of the forum to impose 
its own views over those of the legislature endowed with power to determine the consequences of wrongs 
that take place within its jurisdiction would invite the forum shopping that is to be avoided if we are to 
attain the consistency of result an effective system of conflict of laws should seek to foster’. 
Surely if a claim is not alive in the place of the wrong, it should not be alive in any other 
jurisdiction.   This was exactly what occurred in the recent Canadian case of Vogler v 
Szendroi,136 where the matter could not have proceeded in the place of the wrong, 
Wyoming, because of delayed service of action.  The judge allowed the matter to proceed 
in Nova Scotia because of the different rules that jurisdiction uses to determine when an 
action has been commenced. A broad reading of what is procedural continues to allow 
this possibility.  What purpose does this serve?  It does not uphold our belief that because 
the wrong occurred in Wyoming, the law of Wyoming should resolve the issues.   
 
It is generally accepted that a major purpose of conflicts of laws principles is to give 
effect to foreign rights: 
 
Where rights are acquired under the laws of foreign states, the law of this country recognizes and gives 
effect to those rights, unless it is contrary to the law and policy of this country to do so137   
 
How does allowing a claim to proceed in one jurisdiction, when such a claim would not 
be successful if brought within the jurisdiction where the wrong occurred, do this?  Yet 
this can and has happened if we give broad scope to the meaning of procedural laws.138  
Similarly, how does assessing a damages claim based on forum calculation methods 
‘recognise and give effect to rights acquired under the law of foreign states’? 
 
The answer is that a broad reading of what is procedural, seen most recently in English 
and Canadian decisions, does not uphold, but subverts, territoriality, a principle which 
English, Canadian and Australian choice of law principles supposedly uphold. 
 
(e) Are Issues Regarding the Classification of Statutes of Limitation and Assessment of 
Damages Linked? 
One question relates to a possible link between the issues of statutes of limitation being 
classified as substantive or procedural, and the issue of whether questions about damages 
should be classified as substantive or procedural.  Conceptually on one view they are 
linked, because they both allow exceptions to the now-accepted dominant principle of 
territoriality and to giving effect to the law of the place of the wrong as the substantive 
law to resolve the dispute.  They both separate the right to claim something from an 
assessment of its value.  Evidence that they are linked appears in the judgments of 
Stevens and Pfeiffer.  The writer does not, with respect, agree with the majority judgment 
in Stevens but the judges made an interesting observation about the link.  Discussing the 
distinction between different kinds of limitation statutes, with one being substantive and 
the other procedural, the majority then note 
 
                                                 
136 [2008] NSCA 18 
137 Hooper v Gumm (1867) 2 Ch App 282, 289 
138 Alternatively, there is the possibility that a head of damage is available according to the law of the place 
of the wrong but not the forum.  (This was indeed the situation that occurred in Red Sea Insurance Co v 
Bouygues SA [1995] 1 AC 190).  This is the situation that leads Carruthers to conclude that ‘it would be 
less artificial for quantification to be performed according to the law of the cause’:  Janeen Carruthers 
‘Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws: A Continuing Debate in Relation to Damages’ (2004) 53 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 691,704.   
A similar distinction (emphasis added) has been drawn between a law which denies a remedy in respect of 
a particular head of damage in negligence (a substantive law) and a law which affects the quantification of 
damages in respect of a particular head of damage (a procedural law)139
 
Conclusions about the two issues were also drawn in the same paragraph in the Pfeiffer 
judgment – when the comment is made that the application of any limitation period 
should be seen as substantive in nature, the next comment is that all questions about the 
kinds of damage or amount of damages should ‘likewise’ be treated as substantive. 
 
The point is – having abolished the distinction between different kinds of limitation 
periods (now they are all classified as substantive), should not the High Court of 
Australia, by parity of reasoning, also insist on the abolition of the former distinction 
between heads of damage and quantifications of damage, and treat them both as 
substantive, governed (at least in the large majority of cases) by the law of the place of 
the wrong?  If the High Court can assert in Pfeiffer that ‘mattes that affect the existence, 
extent (emphasis added) or enforceability of the rights and duties of the parties to an 
action are matters that, on their face, appear to be concerned with issues of substance’140, 
why should this not be the case in both international and interstate tort conflict situations? 
 
Certainly, these issues in England have ended up at the same position – commencing in 
1984 when the Foreign Limitation Periods Act required that the limitation rules of the 
law of the cause be applied, to Rome II, which will have the effect that the law of the 
cause will govern quantification of damages.  Mortensen criticizes the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Tolofson v Jensen in not making this link explicit, with the 
consequence that courts have been allowed to continue to resort to the distinction to apply 
their own law: 
 
In dealing only with the characterization of statutes of limitation as substantive, La Forest J did narrow the 
Canadian approach to procedural law.  However, in failing to link this explicitly to the need to give fuller 
effect to the territorial principles underlying the lex loci delicti rule, his Lordship left some room for the 
Provincial courts to maintain the characterization of other questions as procedure as a means of escaping to 
the lex fori.  That this has allowed Ontario’s own ‘policy considerations’ to be elevated above Tolofson’s 
strict principle of territoriality merely reinforces the conceptual difficulty of treating the assessment of 
damages in this way141
  
(f) The Distinction Must Not be Used as an Escape Device  
Central to the author’s thinking on these issues is the concern that the distinction between 
matters of substance and procedure not be misused.  As indicated, it serves a useful 
purpose to smooth the flow of court proceedings, and to that end must be upheld.  The 
danger, however, to which others have averred,142 is that the distinction be used for 
purposes that are considered illegitimate – specifically, to justify resort to the law of the 
                                                 
139 457 (Brennan Dawson Toohey McHugh JJ) 
140 543 (Gleeson CJ Gaudron McHugh Gummow and Hayne JJ) 
141 Reid Mortensen ‘Homing Devices in Choice of Tort Law: Australian, British and Canadian Approaches’ 
(2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 839, 876 
142 Reid Mortensen ‘Homing Devices in Choice of Tort Law: Australian, British and Canadian Approaches’ 
(2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 839, 857-863; Janeen Carruthers ‘Substance and 
Procedure in the Conflict of Laws: A Continuing Debate in Relation to Damages’ (2004) 53 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 691, 709 
forum.  Courts have a natural desire to wish to apply their own law because it is familiar.  
This desire has been responsible for some choice of law rules that have eventually been 
discarded.  We should guard against the same problem in another guise – this time, an 
over-generous application of the concept of what is ‘procedural’.  We should not use the 
device in order to apply forum law because we think it might deliver a ‘better’ result.143
 
What is Procedural? 
A broad view of what is substantive must be taken.144  It has already been suggested what 
is substantive – the kinds of remedies that are available, things that affect the 
quantification of damages and statutes of limitation are all submitted to be matters of 
substance, to be governed by the law of the cause.  Quantification of damages include 
whether any defences are available, including contributory negligence,145 volenti, and the 
doctrine of common employment (where available) and the effect of these defences on 
damages.  It would include whether claimed damages are too remote or reasonably 
foreseeable.  It would include whether the principle of proportionate liability applies or 
not.146  It would include questions of discount and/or interest.147  
                                                 
143 Anthony Gray ‘Remedy Issues in Multinational Tort Claims’ (2007) 26(1) University of Queensland 
Law Journal 1, 13; cf the Ontario Court of Appeal in Somers v Fournier [2002] OJ No 2543 ‘the policy 
considerations which support the goal of avoiding such awards … favour characterization of the cap as a 
matter of procedural law’, and Jean-Gabriel Castel ‘Back to the Future!: Is the New Rigid Choice of Law 
Rule for Interprovincial Torts Constitutionally Mandated?’ (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 35, 68: 
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144 Lorenzen viewed it as anything which bears substantially upon the rights of the parties: Note in (1933) 
47 Harvard Law Review 315, 317 
145 held to be substantive in Fitzpatrick v International Ry (1929) 252 NY 127,134-135 (New York Court of 
Appeals); Callinan J in BHP Billiton v Schultz and Others (2004) 221 CLR 400, 485 agreed that defences 
were substantive, as they affect quantification of damages.   
146 These issues would, of course, be a matter of evidence, but it is submitted that in the vast majority of 
cases (at least), including with the rapid growth of information accessibility with the Internet, it would be 
possible to find this information.  Perhaps an exception could be needed when it is not reasonably possible 
to find out the law of the place of the wrong on a particular matter regarding damages.  This may have been 
what Cooke was talking about when he asked how far a forum court could go in applying the law of the 
place of the wrong without unduly inconveniencing itself. 
147  The Australian Law Reform Commission was also minded towards a broader view of what is 
substantive, but appears to have been influenced by outside advice.  The Commission in its Choice of Law 
Report 1992 No 58 conceded that ‘logically … all assessment of damages should be substantive’, but 
concluded with a (then) orthodox view (based on the ‘prevailing view of the (unnamed) consultants’) that 
the assessment of damages was not to be treated as substantive in international matters (para 10.44).  Part 
of the reasoning provided was that it would ‘surely be a practical impossibility for an Australian court as a 
matter of course to exercise an overseas court’s discretion as to the amount to be awarded for pain and 
suffering for example in an overseas motor vehicle accident.  The problem of assessing the relevant awards 
in every jurisdiction in the world is for (sic) too daunting’.  This is submitted to be weak reasoning – the 
Commission had earlier found that at least in most cases, the law of the place of the wrong should be 
applied as the substantive law in torts conflict cases.  Is it more daunting to determine compensation for 
pain and suffering according to the law of (say) Mogadishu, than it is to determine negligence under that 
law?  It seems to the writer to be drawing a fine distinction without clear reasoning.  Further, with the 
development of the Internet and improved lines of communication between nations, the problem of finding 
the law of another country is surely less daunting than it was in 1992, though the author accepts there are 
 
The author suggests that, consistently with the mode or conduct of proceedings/undue 
inconvenience tests, the following should be regarded as matters of procedure to be 
governed by the law of the forum:148
(a) how the matter gets to court, for example the pleadings, directions hearings, 
discovery etc149 
(b) rules of evidence150 
(c) issues of standing151 
(d) which court in the jurisdiction can hear the matter 
(e) whether the matter is heard by a judge or jury152 
(f) whether damages are assessed on a once and for all basis or not153 
(g) whether any damages awarded must be paid as a lump sum or can be paid 
periodically154 
(h) time periods for filing documents (other than initiating process)155 
(i) dismissal for want of prosecution156 
(j) avenues for appeal157 
 
A narrow view of what is procedural would be consistent and intellectually coherent with 
general trends in choice of law rules towards territoriality and away from a requirement 
of actionability according to the law of the forum.158  As Reid Mortensen puts it 
                                                                                                                                                 
still difficulties in relation to some countries around the world.  It would be interesting to see what view the 
Commission would have of this issue in 2008 in the light of Pfeiffer and Zhang.   
 
148 This is not submitted as an exhaustive list but includes the kinds of matters that have previously been 
considered by the courts, as well as those which have not (to the author’s knowledge), but which the author 
believes fit the definition of matters of procedure. 
149 BHP Billiton Ltd v Utting [2005] NSWSC 260; BI (Contracting) Pty Limited [2005] NSWSC 592 
150 This is procedural, according to the Second Restatement (p511); cf Callinan J in BHP Billiton v Schultz 
(2004) 221 CLR 400 who suggested that rules denying natural justice were substantive (491)  
151 Ibid (standing referred here as the right to be heard).  Crawford claims the issue of the right to sue is a 
substantive one: Elizabeth Crawford ‘The Adjective and the Noun: Title and Right to Sue in International 
Private Law’ [2000] Juridical Review 347.  She refers to the Scottish case of McElroy v McAllister (1949) 
SC 110, where a Scottish man died in an accident in England, allegedly through the fault of his fellow 
Scottish employee.  Under Scots law the executor of a will could not commence legal action on behalf of 
the estate; under English law the executor could.  The Scottish court applied the double actionability rule, 
and found that the first limb was not satisfied – the executor was denied compensation.   
152 The Second Restatement also classifies this issue as procedural only (p511). 
153 identified as procedural by Dicey and Morris, p943; see also Mason CJ (dissenting) in Stevens v Head 
(1992) 176 CLR 433, 449  
154 Cheshire and North’s Private International Law p95-96; see also Mason CJ (dissenting) in Stevens v 
Head (1992) 176 CLR 433, 449 
155 KC v College of Physical Therapists of Alberta (1998) 157 DLR (4th) 31, 36; cf the recent decision in 
Vogler v Szendroi [2008] NSCA 18, where the judge found that a Wyoming provision stating that an action 
would only be deemed to have commenced when documents had been served on the other side was 
procedural only and thus not applicable where proceedings were commenced in Nova Scotia rather than 
Wyoming.  (It was common ground that the Wyoming limitation period as the lex causae applied). 
156 Cf Alberta Mortgage and Housing Corporation v Kalpstein (1999) 1 WWR 355, 361 
157 Cf Callinan J in BHP Billiton v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400 who suggested that appeal provisions were 
substantive (490); an assertion Kirby J described in the same case as ‘arguable’ (460) 
158 Some might argue that the experience has been that courts have not found a narrow view of procedure to 
be attractive, and have constantly sought to find ways to give more scope to the law of the forum, including 
 
Once the basic choice of law rule for matters of substance is freed of necessary reference to the lex fori, the 
idea that the assessment of damages is procedural and something for the lex fori to deal with also 
necessarily loses any foundation159
 
It would be consistent with trends in Europe, particularly the 2007 regulation mandating 
the substantive law to be applicable to the existence, nature and assessment of damages 
or remedies in non-contractual obligation cases.  It would also be consistent with the 
Rome Convention on contractual obligations, and there is much to be said for 
harmonization of the approaches in contract and tort.  It is hoped that the Canadian 
Supreme Court will continue with its approach to substance/procedure identified in 
Tolofson, and that the High Court of Australia resolves the question left open in Zhang by 
applying the law of the place of the wrong to quantum issues, consistently with its moves 
elsewhere in choice of law in recent years., away from double actionability and towards 
the primacy of the law of the place of the wrong.160  Consistency in approach might 
suggest then a broad view be given to what is substantive, along the lines suggested by 
Mason CJ and Deane J in McKain and Stevens.   If Rome II is interpreted as expected, 
quantum issues will be resolved by the law of the cause, in countries to which the 
convention applies.  Hopefully, this will avoid a repeat of Harding. 
 
Conclusion - Remaining Faithful to the Reasons for the Distinction 
The distinction between matters of substance and matters of procedure serves a purpose 
in conflicts law.  It justifies a court in adopting its own procedures in conducting the 
proceedings, but does not allow a forum court to apply rules that affect substantive rights, 
including substantive remedies (including anything relevant to quantum).  As Cook and 
others have argued, a narrow view must be taken of matters that are procedural, limited to 
matters relating to the conduct of proceedings and efficiency.  Unless we bear in mind the 
reason for the distinction, the distinction might be used for unacceptable reasons, and to 
deal with problems in the conflict of laws such as choice of law that are better solved 
using other tools.  The past distinction drawn between right and remedy, influencing 
positions on damages issues as well as statutes of limitation, does not serve us well and 
should not be continued.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
a broader view of procedure.  I would argue in response that choice of law rules have moved much further 
towards the application of the law of the place of the wrong, and as a result discounted the importance of 
the law of the forum.  This has occurred at court level, and also in legislation and conventions.  Growth in 
globalization, growth in international awareness more generally, and increasing ability to know what the 
foreign law is can only assist in future in the application of the law of the place of the wrong, wherever 
situated.  The author believes these developments will ensure that the broad view of substance will be 
applied in future, and a correspondingly narrow view of procedure taken. 
159 ‘Homing Devices in Choice of Tort Law: Australian, British and Canadian Approaches’ (2006) 55 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 839, 876 
160 I must concede that the High Court of Australia’s approach on a related but distinct topic recently, that 
of renvoi, gives me some doubt as to the High Court’s commitment to the law of the place of the wrong:  
Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 331; ‘The Rise of Renvoi in 
Australia: Creating the Theoretical Framework’ (2007) 30 University of New South Wales Law Journal 103.  
The High Court there controversially applied the renvoi doctrine to avoid the application of the law of the 
wrong. 
 
